Testimony of Professor
Richard G. Wilkins,
J. Reuben Clark Law School,
Brigham Young University
U.S. Senate Committee on the
Judiciary
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights
Hearing on "What is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan
Defense of Marriage Act of 1996?"
September 4, 2003
Thank you for the opportunity to present brief testimony on
this important issue. I would like to
focus briefly on two topics that I think are particularly important and useful
to the subcommittee in its effort to develop a complete record on what is
needed to preserve congressional intent in passing the Defense of Marriage
Act. One is the likelihood that this
Act will survive a constitutional challenge.
The other is the extent to which our courts are being influenced by the
actions of other nations and United Nations organizations with respect to the
legalization of same sex marriage.
Discussion of any public policy affecting marriage must
first and foremost acknowledge that marriage has always been an essential
element of strong families. As such,
marriage and the family are the foundations of American society. There is no political issue that is more
important than assessing and maintaining the health of these vitally
important social institutions. As Brigitte
Berger recently noted, "[a]lthough of late we can witness a public rediscovery
of the salutary role of the nuclear family of father, mother, and their
children living together and caring for their individual and collective
progress, policy elites appear neither to have fully understood that public
life lies at the mercy of private life, nor do they seem to have apprehended
the degree to which the bourgeois virtues and bourgeois ethos continue
to be indispensable for the maintenance of both the market economy and civil
society." B. Berger, "The Social Roots
of Prosperity and Liberty," 35 Society 44 (March 13, 1998) (available on
Westlaw at 1998 WL 11168752).
The strength of America's economy and its society depend upon
the strength of its marriages and families.
Those who complain that focusing on preserving and promoting these vital
institutions is somehow less important or less urgent than dealing with more
immediate and supposedly more important issues like terrorism or the economy
are ignoring the lessons history has taught across cultures and over the
millennia. The truth is that our
ability to deal with these any problems is directly correlated to the strength
and resilience of our society and our people. There is no issue more important
than preserving and promoting such fundamental social institutions as marriage
and I commend the chairman for calling these hearings to consider what steps
are necessary to do that.
In 1996, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act to
safeguard marriage as an institution between a man and a woman. The Act does so by defining "marriage" and
"spouse" for federal purposes as a union between a man and a woman and by
providing that States need not recognize same-sex marriages performed and valid
in another State. Whether the Act is
constitutional is subject to serious debate.
While some legal scholars have asserted that the Act passes constitutional
muster (see list attached as Appendix A), the preponderance of the legal
literature claims that the Act is unconstitutional (See Appendix B). The constitutional validity of the Act may
be determined shortly, as many observers expect that Massachusetts will become
the first State to recognize same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
pending).
But, whatever its constitutional validity, our country now
faces a fundamental question that is not answered by the 1996 Defense of
Marriage Act. Is there a federal constitutional
right to same-sex marriage? If the Due
Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution are
construed by the United States Supreme Court to embody a "right" to same-sex
marriage, the Defense of Marriage Act's definition of marriage and the leeway
the Act grants States with regard to the interstate recognition of same-sex
unions become irrelevant. Recent legal developments, moreover, clearly
make such a construction of the United States Constitution more likely than
not.
Evidence of that is the recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas, No. 02-102 (June 26,
2003), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits States from
criminalizing homosexual sodomy. Although
the precise holding of Lawrence does
not answer the question whether the Constitution confers a "right" to same-sex
marriage, the opinion - as Justice Scalia noted in his dissent - leaves the
marriages laws of all 50 States on "pretty shaky ground." It does so for two reasons.
First, the Court's majority opinion suggests that the Due
Process Clause endows sexual partners
with a constitutional entitlement to determine for themselves their "own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life." To the extent that the Court
actually believes this rhetoric, this sentence - without more - is adequate to
support a holding imposing same-sex marriage on all 50 States. See,
e.g., http://www.aclu.org/LesbianGayRights/LesbianGayRights.cfm?ID=13011&c=41. I am certain that this Committee will hear
extensive testimony on this aspect of Lawrence. Therefore, I will not dwell on this point
and, instead, will move to the second reason why Lawrence dramatically undermines the policies adopted by Congress
with the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act.
Lawrence not only announces a dramatic expansion in the reach of the Due
Process Clause, it also suggests that the meaning of the Clause may be heavily
influenced by the legal traditions of other nations. The Lawrence Court
cited decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, as well as a brief filed
by Mary Robinson, former UN High Commissioner of Human Rights, in support of
its decision. The Court concluded that
the "right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral
part of human freedom in many other countries." Should the Court follow this analytical path, it is only a matter
of time before same-sex marriage becomes part and parcel of the United States
Constitution.
In addition, many organs within the UN System openly
advocate the legal recognition of same-sex marriage. Mary Robinson, whose brief was cited by the Supreme Court in Lawrence, gave an address while she was
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in which she extolled the virtues of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a "living document." In that "living document," she discovered
the right to be free of "all discrimination" based on sexual orientation. Mary Robinson, The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights: A living document, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/3/e/980127.htm
(statement by Mrs. Mary Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights at the Symposium on Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region, United
Nations University, Tokyo, Japan, Jan. 27, 1998).
Elizabeth Evatt, a member of the UN Human Rights Committee,
has similarly declared categorically that "intolerance of homosexuality [is] a
clear case of discrimination and inequality" that falls "clearly within the
scope of human rights protection and there should be no debate or
controversy." Press Release NGO/307
PI/1080, DPI/NGO Conference Examines Universality of Human Rights in Context of
Diverse Cultures, DPI/NGO Annual Conference - 4 - Press Release NGO/307 PM
Meeting PI/1080 14 September 1998, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19980914.ngo307.htm
I have spent a
considerable amount of time in Europe over the past year trying to help groups
concerned about the trends in some nations and in the developing EU
Constitution towards liberalized social policies such as legalizing same sex
marriage and undermining what we Americans consider such basic rights as
freedom of speech and freedom of religion.
The same pressures by various special interests in Europe that are now
manifesting themselves are also building here in the United States.
Disturbing evidence of that was the conclusion of the
majority in Lawrence that States could no longer regulate homosexual sodomy, at
least in part, because "the right the
petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human
freedom in many other countries." With
the clear trends in Europe, as well as other countries like Canada, the same is
now true (or soon will be) regarding same-sex marriage.
Opinion polls in
this country clearly show that by substantial margins a majority of Americans
oppose legalizing same sex marriage.
That public opinion is clearly reflected in the Defense of Marriage
Act. Yet, Lawrence suggests that, without clear action to establish that the
Constitution of the United States does not
mandate same-sex marriage, the marital policies established by Congress
in that Act will survive only at the sufferance - indeed, the whim - of the
federal judiciary. In a democratic
system, that is completely unacceptable.
Let me conclude by
answering the question that is the point of these hearings: What is necessary
to defend the intent of the Defense of
Marriage Act? Based on either
one of the two trends I have discussed briefly here, the likely constitutional
validity of the Act and the growing influence of international actions on
federal courts, the clear answer is to amend the Constitution. The compounding impact of the confluence of
these two trends, and the damage which inevitably will result if the judiciary
is permitted to dictate such a fundamental social change as legalizing same sex
marriage, make amending the Constitution to preserve the intent of Congress in
this Act imperative.